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ERIE RAILROAD V. TOMPKINS
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Clean Hands. Where a person has engaged in
iJ11proper co~duct in a transaction an~ seeks eqitable relief m respect to that transact10n, a court
:pplying this maxim wil~ r~fuse relief. The ~axim
·s a reflection of the pnnc1ple of that eqmty op~rated as a court of conscience. ~ court cannot be
used to promote or condone cnmes or breaches
of public morality. Thus, if a person seeks to set
aside a transaction on the ground Qf fraud he must
be free of any participation in the fraud. The
maxim constitutes a defense only to equitable
*remedies, injunction, and specific performance,
for example. It does not apply to common-law
remedies.
Laches. This defense is associated with maxim:
"Equity aids the vigilant." Broadly defined,
"!aches" is any unreasonable delay by a person
possessing a legal right in enforcing that legal right
that produces prejudice to the person against
whom the legal right is being enforced. In addition, the holder of a right may by his conduct be
fairly regarded as waiving that right. A court will
not grant an equitable remedy in favor of a person
whose conduct amounts to laches or acquiescence.
The prejudice following from the delay may be to
third parties.
Estoppel. Estoppel is a substantive equitable
principle that precludes a party to a legal proceeding from asserting against another facts, rights, or
absence of legal rights. The object of estoppel is
to preclude unconscionable departure by a person
for an assumption for which he or she bears responsibility and that has been adopted by another
as a basis for action or inaction, to his detriment.
Estoppel existed as common law, as well as in equity. Equitable estoppel precluded the enforcement of equitable relief.
The major development was *promissory estoppel in which one party to a *contract who represents he will not enforce his rights, will be precluded from that enforcement. In this form
estoppel remains a defense and this is properly
described as equitable. The courts, however, in
Anglo-American law began to accept that promissory estoppel could be cause of action where one
party makes a representation to another which is
relied upon to his detriment.
Constructive Trust. The courts of equity devised
the institution of the *trust. Trusts are often expressly created by parties. A trustee holds property
for the benefit of another, the beneficiary. The
trustee holds the legal estate, the beneficiary, the
equitable estate. Equity imposes exacting obligations on the trustee to handle the property for the
benefit of the beneficiary.

271

A constructive trust is imposed where it would
be unconscionable for the legal owner to retain
the benefit of the equitable estate. The constructive trust is remedial in nature, although it effects
a change in the nature of property. Constructive
trusts are imposed for a number of reasons including giving recognition of a preexisting property right, enforcing equitable principles, encouraging observance of equitable obligations,
deterrence of breaches of fiduciary duties and
remedying unconscionable behavior including unjust enrichment. The constructive trust is a discretionary remedy, the imposition of which turns
on the courts review of the rights of third parties
and the conduct of the parties-it is a powerful
remedy. The constructive trust gives a property interest enforceable against purchases to the beneficiary who has notice of the circumstances leading
to the imposition of the constructive trust. The
equity courts allowed holders of equitable rights
to trace that as property into the hands of others.
Like the express trustee, a constructive trustee is
personally liable to compensate the beneficiary for
losses caused in mishandling the property and to
account for any profits made for its use.
In these maxims, defenses, and institutions of
equity the common theme is that equity will not
allow legal rights to be enforced in a harsh and
unconscionable way, and will create remedies, like
constructive trust, to more thoroughly and flexibly
deliver just results beyond the parameters of legal
rights and remedies.
[See also Procedure, Civil]
• Jairus W. Perry, ed. Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 12th
ed., 1877. J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal
History, 3d ed., 1990. P. C. Hoffer, The Law's Conscience:
Equitable Constitutionalism in America, 1990. D. Parkinson, The Principles of Equity, 1996.
-David F. Partlett

EQUITY JURISDICTION. See Equity.
ERIE RAILROAD V. TOMPKINS 304 U.S. 64
(1938), limited the power of federal courts to create judge-made law that would displace state law.
Jurists view the Supreme Court's decision both a
modern cornerstone of American judicial *federalism and an example of legal realism's influence.
Prior to Erie, federal *courts applied state statutory law, but did not feel bound to apply state
*common law rules in areas of general law, such
as torts and contracts. Instead, federal courts created their own common law in these areas. This
was not viewed as displacing state authority because law, from a jurisprudential standpoint, was
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thought to exist independently of any sovereign;
thus, federal courts were as competent as state
courts to ascertain the true common law. The Erie
decision reflected growing concern about the unfairness of having different legal principles apply
solely on the basis of whether the plaintiff brought
the case in state or federal court. It also reflected
legal realism's emergence as a jurisprudential theory and a rejection of the notion that common
law is a transcendental body of law existing independently of any sovereign. The Erie holding
that federal courts do not have the power to create
general common law reflects the realist understanding that, if a federal court announces a common law rule, it is creating federal law and must
have a basis of authority in the U.S. *Constitution.
The Court found no such general authority, although federal courts can develop their own rules
of procedure.
[See also Commercial Law; Swift v. Tyson
(1842)]
• John H. Ely, "The Irrepressible Myth of Erie," Harvard
Law Review 87 (1974): 693-740.

-Wendy C. Perdue
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The owner of *property may dispose of it at death
by a *will. The will is a formal document signed
by the property owner, the "testator," and witnessed at its signing by two individuals. At the
testator's death the will is submitted to a court to
establish its validity. This is referred to as the "probate" (proving) of the will. The testator is said to
die "testate."
The will was part of the English legal heritage
of the American colonists. It was recognized by
the English Statute of Wills (1540), a law based on
existing customs. During the nineteenth century,
American states tended to adopt more formal
rules governing the execution of wills, and they
treated land and personal property as the same for
the purpose of disposition by will. Generally, only
wealthy persons made wills in the nineteenth century, and wills were prepared by testators on their
deathbed more frequently than in modern practice, with its focus on estate planning. After 1900,
wealthy testators began to engage in careful planning of will provisions in order to minimize estate
taxes and provide for future contingencies.
The will usually designates an executor, who
during probate is appointed by the court to ad-

m1mster the estate of the testator. The executor
collects the assets of the testator, pays the testator's
creditors, the administration expenses, and any estate taxes owed by the estate, and distributes the
remainder to those named in the will. The executor functions under the supervision of the court.
The law of the state in which the testator was a
resident at the time of death governs the will and
the administration of the estate, except that federal
estate taxes may be applicable to the estate.
In order to execute a valid will a testator must
have the requisite mental capacity. This requirement is important because many testators are elderly. The testator must have the capacity to know
the nature of his property, know the natural objects of his bounty, form an orderly disposition,
and understand the disposition in his will. In addition, the testator must be free from undue influence in the execution of his will. An elderly testator may become subject to the influence of a
person to such an extent that he cannot resist doing what that person wants him to do. This may
result in executing a will that makes a disposition
of property to such person that is unusual. If undue influence is judged to exist, the provisions of
the will that are the product of undue influence
are invalid. The circumstances that may give rise
to a presumption of undue influence are a testator
who is known to be susceptible to undue influence, a confidential relationship between the testator and the person allegedly exercising the influence, and a provision for the confidant in the will
that is unusual.
The will has no legal effect during the life of the
testator. It can be amended at any time or revoked
in its entirety by a subsequent writing executed by
the testator in accordance with the formalities required for a will. A will can also be revoked by
the testator by destruction or by drawing lines
across its face with the intention to revoke the will.
The testator may execute a new will any number
of times.
The will may contain several different types of
gifts. With the "specific gift" the testator disposes
of specifically described land or jewelry or other
property. A ,testator who makes such a gift assumes that she will own that property at her deatli;
if she does not, the gift may fail. Another form of
gift is the "general gift," in which the testator disposes of a certain sum of money to a person. If
there is insufficient cash in the estate to pay the
gift, the executor sells assets of the estate to produce cash sufficient to pay the gift. A
form
of gift is the "residuary gift." When the testator
executes a will, she does not know exactly what
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